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After the expansionary phase of the “heterodox” experiment (1986–
1987) of the García government, the Peruvian economy fell into a very
deep recession. Output fell between 1988 and 1990, in the midst of a hyper-
inﬂationary process. The Fujimori government implemented a harsh macro-
economic stabilization program in August 1991, and a few months later a
comprehensive set of structural reforms was launched. Peru experienced
one of the fastest trade liberalization processes and one of the deepest la-
bor market reforms in Latin America. These reforms were accompanied
by a downsizing of the public sector, the start of a privatization process,
theabolition of all state-owned monopolies, and a tax reform. In addition,
restrictions to capital account transactions were eliminated while the ﬁ-
nancial sector was deregulated.
The Peruvian Labor Code, developed during the import substitution pe-
riod, had been termed one of the most restrictive, protectionist, and cum-
bersome of Latin America (International Labor Organization [ILO] 1994).
The code was extremely complex and comprised a collection of overlap-
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in this project.ping decrees that had undergone many changes over time. The military
government of 1969–1975 made ﬁring extremely diﬃcult by sanctioning
job stability after a probationary period. In 1985, the García government
reduced the probationary period to just three months, during what was the
period of most rigid labor market legislation. In 1991, labor market regu-
lations were relaxed through a succession of reforms. Firing costs dimin-
ished sharply through the progressive elimination of job stability regula-
tions, the reduction in red tape for the use of temporary contracts, and
changes in the severance payment structure. In addition, ﬁrms in the for-
mal sector faced high nonwage costs: payroll taxes, social security and
health contributions, a tenure bonus, training fund contributions, family
allowances, and a long thirty-day vacation period. During the 1990s over-
all nonwage costs increased slightly.
One ﬁrst adjustment mechanism to a restrictive labor legislation is the
use of informal contracts. In this sense, changes in ﬁring costs expected by
the ﬁrm and in nonwage labor costs have an impact on the distribution of
employment between the formal and informal sectors but not necessarily
on overall employment. If ﬁring costs are perceived by ﬁrms as a tax im-
posed on layoﬀs, a reduction, like the one observed in Peru given the fall in
expected severance payments, and the abolition of job stability and the fa-
cilities given for the use of temporary contracts will increase the equilib-
rium employment level. Moreover, reductions in expected ﬁring costs may
have an eﬀect on the response pattern of ﬁrms to changes in product de-
mand, which may be reﬂected in larger employment-output elasticities. In
this paper, we analyze the impact of changes in expected severance pay-
ments and labor costs by estimating labor demand functions for the formal
sector. We use data from ﬁrm-level surveys for formal ﬁrms in Metropoli-
tan Lima. With these data we construct a pseudo-panel data set of ten eco-
nomic sectors observed bimonthly during the period 1987–1997 and three
shorter panels of about 400 ﬁrms for the periods 1987–1990, 1991–1994,
and 1995–1997, dates dictated by sample changes.
Also, reductions in labor legislation–related ﬁrings costs typically accel-
erate the process of job creation and job destruction, therefore increasing
turnover and reducing job duration, particularly in the formal sector. We
examine changes in job duration and labor market turnover using data
from a series of annual household surveys, with which we analyze changes
in mean tenure in both the formal and informal sectors. Informality is con-
ceptualized here as a state chosen by ﬁrms and workers depending on a
cost-beneﬁt analysis. Many ﬁrms, typically smaller ones, operate totally
underground, ﬁre and hire at will, and do not pay any kind of socially man-
dated beneﬁts. In most of the cases, their productivity is too low for them
to aﬀord to pay any kind of beneﬁts. To operationalize this we deﬁne a
worker as working in the formal sector if he or she receives social beneﬁts
or belongs to a union. In addition, using the Living Standards Measure-
132 Jaime Saavedra and Máximo Toreroment Survey, we construct complete and incomplete employment spells
with which we calculate empirical hazards for diﬀerent subsamples, and we
estimate exponential hazard models.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we analyze the legal con-
text regarding the probationary period, severance payments, nonwage
costs, and temporary contracts, all factors that aﬀect ﬁrm and worker be-
havior. We also describe changes in employment in Metropolitan Lima
during the period of analysis and discuss how informality and temporary
contracts have been mechanisms through which ﬁrms avoid paying man-
dated beneﬁts and ﬁring costs. In section 2.3 we present results of labor de-
mand estimations at both the sectoral and ﬁrm levels. Finally, in section
2.4, we analyze basic patterns of employment duration. In order to assess
possible impacts of labor laws, we compare patterns of the self-employed
with those of wage earners in the formal and informal sectors. We present
a comparison of job duration among diﬀerent groups of workers using em-
pirical hazards, and we show the results of exponential hazards functions.
2.2 Changes in the Regulatory Framework during the 1990s
Prior to the reforms, the Peruvian Labor Code was extremely complex
and comprised a large collection of overlapping decrees. Formal workers
enjoyed several employment stability provisions, payroll taxes and social
security contributions were high, and collective bargaining and other
regulations gave unions great power. Since 1991, labor market regulations
were relaxed through a succession of reforms. In this section we describe
the changes in ﬁring costs determined by the severance payment and job
stability regulations, the changes in regulations and in the use of temporary
contracts, and the evolution of nonwage labor costs.
2.2.1 Severance Payments and Job Stability
The costs of ﬁring in Peru comprised two main elements, mandated
severance payments upon dismissal and the costs imposed by job stability
regulations. The military government of General Velasco introduced sev-
erance payments in 1970, as a ﬁxed value equivalent to three months’wages
upon dismissal without “just cause.” It was conceived as a compensation
to the hardship of dismissal and simultaneously as an unemployment in-
surance device. In addition to severance payments, Peruvian labor laws
had very rigid employment protection clauses, which increased ﬁring costs
dramatically. During the period 1971–1991, a worker who completed the
probationary period—the length of which was changed a few times—was
granted absolute job stability. That meant that if a ﬁrm dismissed a worker
and could not prove just cause in labor courts, he or she could choose be-
tween being reinstated in the job and receiving the severance payment. This
made the severance payment the lower bound of the ﬁring cost, as workers
Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact: Peru 133had the incentive to ask to be reinstated in their jobs, and then settling out
of court became a larger severance payment. This setting also implied high
administrative and litigation costs. Just cause did not include economic
reasons, and workers could be ﬁred due only to serious misdemeanor or
through complicated collective layoﬀs. From the employers’ perspective, a
worker was eﬀectively “owner of his post.”
In 1978, the length of the probationary period was increased to three
years (see table 2.1). The severance payment schedule was raised, and
workers with less than three years in a ﬁrm received the equivalent of three
months’ wages if ﬁred without notice, while workers with longer tenures re-
ceived twelve months’ wages upon dismissal. During the probationary pe-
riod, the employer had to inform the worker in advance if he wanted to ﬁre
him to avoid the severance payment.
Since June 1986, the probationary period was reduced again, to just three
months, and a large portion of workers suddenly acquired total job stabil-
ity. An interesting feature here is that the change was announced in June
1985, about a year before the law was eﬀectively sanctioned. Casual evi-
dence for that year shows that employers did not increase layoﬀs massively
among workers with less than three years of tenure who had not concluded
their probationary period. Given that the economy was starting an expan-
sionary period, it is probable that business expectations regarding higher
demand were on the rise, which reduced the incentive of employers to ﬁre
workers that could potentially receive job stability rights. Still, the an-
nouncement of the policy change, ceteris paribus, must have had a positive
eﬀect on turnover for these workers. The severance payment was set to the
equivalent of three months’ wages for those workers who had been em-
ployed between three months and one year, six months’ wages for those with
one to three years of tenure, and twelve months’ wages for those with more
than three years of tenure (see García schedule in ﬁgure 2.1 and table 2.2).
The June 1986 changes in labor laws by the García administration made
the 1986–1991 period the one with the highest degree of rigidity, as sever-
ance payments were high, the probationary period was short, and job sta-
bility rights were still in place. Rigid job protection pushed ﬁrms to seek
ways to get around these regulations. One way was to lobby for the gener-
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Table 2.1 Probationary Period and Job Stability Regulations
Probationary Job Temporary 
Period Stability  Contracts 
Length Status Availability
Before June 1986 3 years Granted after 3 years Low
June 1986–October 1991 3 months Granted after 3 months Low
November 1991–July 1995 3 months In eﬀect only for workers  High
hired before November 1991
After July 1995 3 months Abolished Highation of the so-called Emergency Employment Program. The other form
was to ﬁre workers a few days before they completed the three-month pro-
bationary period and then rehire them. Another form of eluding these reg-
ulations was making workers sign an undated letter of resignation at the
beginning of the contract period.
In 1991, the government introduced several changes aimed at reducing
the extreme rigidity imposed by labor laws. The intention of the drafters of
the Law Decree 726 of November 1991 was to abolish job stability. How-
ever, the right to job stability was written in the 1979 Constitution, so, in
principle, only through a two-year process could the Congress pass a law
approving a constitutional change. The outcome was the creation of a dual
regime in which workers with contracts signed before November 1991
maintained their job security rights, while new workers would only have
protection against unjustiﬁed dismissal. This meant that these workers
could be dismissed at will upon payment of a severance beneﬁt. In addi-
tion, just cause clauses were extended to include issues related to workers’
productivity.1Also, the severance payment rule was modiﬁed in order to re-
duce ﬁring costs. It was ﬁxed at one months’ wage for every year of tenure
for workers with more than one year in the ﬁrm, with a minimum of three
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Fig. 2.1 Severance payment regimes
1. In practice, it was very diﬃcult for ﬁrms to use these clauses due to administrative prob-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































smonths’ wages and a maximum of twelve months’ wages, as shown in ﬁg-
ure 2.1 (Fujimori I schedule).
In July 1995, with the second wave of labor reforms, the severance pay-
ment schedule was simpliﬁed to one month per year of work up to a max-
imum of twelve months (Fujimori II schedule in ﬁgure 2.1). As the 1993
Constitution replaced the right to job stability with the right to unjustiﬁed
dismissal, the 1995 law eliminated job security rules and the two-tier
regime. These changes, plus the reduction in severance payments, implied
a sharp reduction in ﬁring costs, which may be interpreted as a lower level
of the tax on dismissals perceived by ﬁrms. This may have the eﬀect of giv-
ing formal ﬁrms more ﬂexibility to adapt to output changes, of increasing
the formal employment level, and also of increasing the output elasticity in
labor demand estimations for formal ﬁrms. In addition, reductions in ﬁr-
ing costs typically accelerate the process of job creation and job destruc-
tion, therefore increasing turnover. Finally, in November 1996 the sever-
ance payments rule was again modiﬁed. Instead of receiving one months’
wage for each year in the ﬁrm, the employee received one and a half
months’ wages, an important large increase in the ﬁring costs of low-
tenured workers. The maximum cap of twelve months’ wages remained un-
altered (Fujimori III schedule in ﬁgure 2.1).
Quantifying the Severance Payment
The severance payment rule has an eﬀect on the amount of resources
ﬁrms have to reserve to ﬁnance dismissals. Given that in Peru, as in many
other Latin American countries, these payments are linked to tenure, these
reserves will vary depending on the tenure structure of the workforce of the
ﬁrm. In turn, the ﬁrm’s tenure structure may be endogenous to the sever-
ance payment rule, as ﬁrms will try to avoid hiring workers who will later
be relatively more expensive to dismiss. The tenure structure will also de-
pend on technology and other characteristics of the ﬁrm and sector.2
We calculated the evolution of potential reserves for severance payment
as a commodity contingent on a ﬁring (F) or a hiring (H) state of the econ-
omy.3We may therefore think of a ﬁrm as choosing among probability dis-
tributions or “prospects” whose uncertain consequences are to be received
with respective state probabilities   (  H,   F). Speciﬁcally, expected sev-
erance payment is calculated by state and sector using the evolution of the
tenure structure, an estimate of the ﬁring probability for each tenure
group, and the corresponding mandated severance payment. The follow-
ing formula describes how it is calculated (time subscripts have been elim-
inated):
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2. For instance, the share of long-tenure workers will generally be larger in the manufac-
turing sector, where ﬁrm- and sector-speciﬁc knowledge is more important than in trade.
3. This is following the expected utility rule of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.E(sp)i    F ∑
X
 (X)i,F   N X   sp(X)     H ∑
X
 (X)i,H   N X   sp(X) 
E(sp)i is the expected severance payment, which is a probability-
weighted average for the severance payments in each of the states, hiring
and ﬁring, and sector i. The ﬁrst bracketed portion corresponds to the sev-
erance payment for the ﬁring state and the second to that for the hiring
states, which are weighted by  H and  F, the probabilities of being in a hir-
ing (H) or in a ﬁring (F) state of the economy, respectively. The severance
payment in each of the bracketed sections for sector i is calculated by mul-
tiplying a time-invariant sector-speciﬁc and state-contingent ﬁring proba-
bility,  i,state(X); by the number of workers in a speciﬁc tenure group (N X);
and by the mandated severance payment that will have to be paid to em-
ployees in that group if they are ﬁred, sp(X). X denotes the tenure group.
To calculate this ﬁring probability we used the average employment reduc-
tion by tenure group in each possible state (hiring and ﬁring), and when
employment grew we assumed zero variation. Because of this, we obtained
a constant probability across the whole period that was diﬀerent across sec-
tors, tenure groups, and states. Data on the structure of tenure groups and
employment changes by sector come directly from the Quarterly Survey of
Wages and Salaries (QSWS).4
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of E(sp) for the period 1986–1996 as
ap ercentage of total wages. Note that we are ﬁxing the sector-speciﬁc ﬁr-
ing probability, so, in this aggregate, changes may only be attributed to
changes in the employment share of diﬀerent sectors and changes in legis-
lation. The ﬁrst large fall in the index is at the end of 1991, and it reﬂects
the reduction in the mandated severance payment schedule. Further
changes are related to increases in the share of short-tenure groups.
Changes observed in June 1995 coincide with a further reduction in man-
dated severance payments, while the increase in August 1998 coincides
with an increase in these payments. On average, reserves that ﬁrms had to
maintain for severance payments were reduced from 16 percent of the wage
bill to around 8 percent after the reforms.5
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4. The survey includes a sample of workers per ﬁrm, from which we calculate the ﬁrm tenure
structure. Nx is calculated with this structure and total ﬁrm employment. The characteristics
of the QSWS will be described presently.
5. Figure 2.2 also shows an “adjusted” E(sp) for the period 1992–1995. The increase in the
calculated E(sp) between 1992 and 1995 is related to an undersampling of newer ﬁrms. Dur-
ing those years the sample was not renewed, so only “deaths” were registered. As no new ﬁrms
entered the sample, older ﬁrms, which tend to have older workers, are overrepresented. This
implies a tenure structure biased toward older workers, therefore increasing the E(sp). In the
calculation of the employment series this problem was tackled through expansion factors that













































































62.2.2 Reducing Rigidities: Temporary Contracts
One possible way of bypassing the large adjustment costs imposed by
employment protection policies is through lobbying the government to in-
troduce short-term or temporary contracts. Temporary contracts were in-
troduced in 1970. Firms required prior authorization from the Ministry of
Labor in order to use them, and contracts were allowed under very speciﬁc
circumstances. In practice, the high administrative costs this process im-
plied restricted their use heavily. As shown in table 2.3, between 1986 and
1990, around 20 percent of workers in formal ﬁrms were under temporary
contracts. Most of them carried full social beneﬁts but had no employment
protection clauses (contratos sujetos a modalidad), and important propor-
tions of temporary workers were probationary-period workers. During the
short-lived populist boom of 1987, in the midst of a period of extreme job
protection, ﬁrms were allowed to hire using short-term temporary con-
tracts through an emergency employment program (Programa Ocupa-
cional de Emergencia,or PROEM). These contracts, which could last up to
a year, were used mainly by large formal ﬁrms.
In August 1991, with the ﬁrst wave of labor reforms, red tape for the use
of ﬁxed-term contracts was signiﬁcantly reduced, and the reasons that
could be used to justify hiring a worker under this type of contract were
increased. The Ministry of Labor conﬁned its role to record keeping and
charging a fee for each contract. In general, in contexts of restrictive job
protection regulations the output elasticity of temporary contracts is
larger than that of permanent contracts, given that usually they do not
carry ﬁring costs (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992). In Peru, despite the re-
duction in ﬁring costs for new workers under permanent contract in 1991,
ﬁrms still preferred the now easier-to-use temporary contracts. The share
of workers under these contracts increased from 20 percent in 1991 to 31
percent in 1992, and most of formal private employment growth observed
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Table 2.3 Metropolitan Lima: Structure of Total Private Formal Salaried Employment,
1986–1997 (%)
1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Permanent 80.7 82.1 82.9 80.8 80.1 68.6 67.9 64.8 59.8 56.0
Temporary 19.3 17.9 17.1 19.2 19.9 31.4 32.1 35.2 40.2 44.0
Fixed-term contract 19.3 17.7 14.3 19.2 19.6 30.0 29.8 33.3 39.4 39.9
Youth contracts 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 2.5
Probationary period — — 2.7 — — 1.4 1.9 1.9 0.5 1.6
Source: Encuesta de Hogares del MTPS 1986–1995, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares del INEI 1997.
Note:Not all the surveys between 1986 and 1997 allow the separation between workers under ﬁxed-term
contracts and those under probationary periods. Dashes indicate that there was no probationary period
in those years.during the 1990s was explained by temporary contracts. Moreover, even af-
ter the elimination of the two-tier system in 1995 with the elimination of
job stability for all workers, as well as an additional reduction in severance
payments, temporary contracts continued growing, covering 44 percent of
private formal wage employment in 1997.6 This could be explained by the
fact that ﬁring costs for permanent workers, even if smaller than before, are
still high or that ﬁrms may be reluctant to hire workers as permanent em-
ployees because they fear a setback in the progress toward ﬂexibility. In
fact, a change in the severance payments schedule in 1997 implied an in-
crease in ﬁring costs.7 In our estimations we cannot distinguish permanent
from temporary contracts; however, the lower administrative costs of using
temporary contracts should imply a larger output elasticity after the re-
forms.
2.2.3 Nonwage Costs
In Peru an important source of public ﬁnance is payroll taxation. This
burden has been heavily criticized, mainly along the lines that these con-
tributions increase labor costs, reduce competitiveness, and have possible
negative eﬀects over employment. Peru has a complicated and unstable
structure of nonwage labor costs, a description of which follows.
• Public and private retirement plan payments. Between 1986 and 1993,
the employer had to pay to the public pension agency, the Instituto Pe-
ruano de Seguridad Social (IPSS), a contribution of 6 percent of the
employee’s wage, while the employee had to pay 3 percent. Poor and
corrupt management, increasing numbers of retirees, and inﬂation
led to the near collapse of the pay-as-you-go public system. In 1993, a
private pension system was created, with individually held accounts
managed by institutions called the Administradoras de Fondos de
Pensiones (AFPs). Currently, both pension systems coexist. In 1995,
after a few changes, the rate was set at a total of 11 percent in both sys-
tems, and the entire contribution had to be paid by the employee.8
• Health plan payments. The public health plan oﬀered by IPSS is still
the only option for workers. The total contribution rate has been ﬁxed
at 9 percent during the last few years. However, its composition with
respect to employers and employees has changed: Before 1995 the em-
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6. By 1997, according to Household Survey data, 316,000 private salaried workers in Lima
had signed temporary contracts. According to the administrative records of the Ministry of
Labor, 434,000 new contracts were signed that year. As a percentage of the total employment
in Lima (i.e., including public workers and the informal sector), the share of workers under
this type of contract reached 24 percent.
7. A surprisingly large output elasticity of temporary contracts was also observed in Spain
in 1986, when the economy picked up and restrictions for the use of temporary contracts had
been lifted, and almost all job creation was explained by this type of contract. Between 1987
and 1990, the share of temporary contracts increased from 15 percent to 32 percent.
8. See details in table 2A.1.ployer had to pay 6 percent and the employee had to pay 3 percent.
Currently, the employer must pay the entire contribution fee.
• Accident insurance. The employer is required to pay a accident insur-
ance for his blue-collar workers. The amount is calculated as a rate of
the employee’s salary. This rate varies depending on the level of risk
involved in the job and averages around 2 percent.
• Manufacturing training fund (SENATI).This is paid by the employers
of ﬁrms in manufacturing industries. Initially it was set at 1.5 percent
of the worker’s income. In 1995, it was reduced to 1.25 percent, in 1996
to 1 percent, and in 1997 to 0.75 percent.
• National Housing Fund (FONAVI). Originally created as a contribu-
tion to workers’ housing needs in the late 1970s, the National Housing
Fund (FONAVI) rapidly resulted in a costly payroll tax, mainly due
to ineﬃcient and faulty management of collected funds.9 Up to 1988,
the FONAVI contribution paid by the employer was 4 percent of the
employee’s wage, while the employee’s rate was 0.5 percent, and the
maximum taxable wage was set at eight tax units (UITs). In November
of that year, the employer’s contribution rate was increased to 5 per-
cent and the employee’s rate to 1 percent. In May of 1991 the employer’s
rate was set at 8 percent, while the employee’s rate remained un-
changed, raising the total contribution to 9 percent and further widen-
ing the gap between the amount paid by the employer and the amount
received by the employee. In January 1993 the employer’s contribution
responsibilities were abolished altogether, and the employee’s rate was
set at 9 percent. Even though the total contribution rate remained con-
stant (at 9 percent), the maximum eﬀective taxable wage was abol-
ished, which might have increased the eﬀective rate. Ten months later,
due to harsh political pressures, the employee’s contribution rate was
diminished to 3 percent and the employer’s rate was increased to 6 per-
cent. In August of 1995 the employee’s contribution was abolished and
the employer’s contribution rate was set at 9 percent. Finally, in Janu-
ary of 1997, the total contribution was reduced to 7 percent (paid com-
pletely by the employer), but the Christmas and holiday bonuses of a
monthly salary were included in the taxable base.
• Individual savings account (Compensación por Tiempo de Servicios, or
CTS). This is additional wage paid by the employer to the employee
for every year of worker tenure. Prior to January 1991, the employer
paid a maximum bonus of ten minimum wages if the employee’s wage
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9. As a result of this, FONAVI became an important issue in political discussion, as oppo-
sition parties used it as justiﬁcation to attack the government, while the latter constantly
shifted the FONAVI rate back and forth between employers or employees and altered its to-
tal level, to satisfy political and ﬁnancing needs. Throughout the document, when talking
about the payroll tax, we refer to this contribution.was higher than that amount. Employers were allowed to keep those
funds until an employee left the ﬁrm (the only obligation being to reg-
ister it in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet as a liability). The system failed due
to employers’ lack of compliance in actually keeping these bonuses for
workers. In actuality, when a worker was ﬁred, the payment of this
bonus worked as an additional ﬁring cost. Since January 1991 the em-
ployer has had to deposit 50 percent of an employee’s monthly salary
in an individual account in the worker’s name in a commercial bank
on May and November of each year.
• Christmas and national holiday bonuses.On December 1989, it became
obligatory for the employer to pay two additional months’ wages to his
employees (on July and December of each year). However, this was al-
ready a common practice before the law was established, especially in
medium-sized and large ﬁrms. In the public sector, these bonuses had
been paid regularly to employees for several years, since the mid-1980s,
but the amount varied.
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the eﬀective rate paid by a ﬁrm in the
case of a blue-collar worker who is aﬃliated to a public pension plan. To
calculate the nonwage costs’ eﬀective rate it was necessary to estimate each
of the nonwage costs just listed. The main diﬃculty in the estimation was
to combine the eﬀect of the diﬀerent rates with the maximum and mini-
mum taxable bases, so we calculated each of the nonwage costs separately
and then summed them together. Most of the sources of change are related
to cap changes in the tenure bonus and changes in the payroll tax rate. In
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Fig. 2.3 Evolution of nonwage costs paid by employersaddition, on several occasions diﬀerent rates were changed in such a way
that the total employer contribution remained unaltered. This is the vari-
able used later in the labor demand estimations.
2.3 Evidence of the Eﬀect of Labor Laws on Labor Demand
We can identify at least three main changes in labor legislation during
the period 1986–1996 that had an eﬀect on labor demand: changes in sev-
erance payments and job stability, changes in nonwage costs, and changes
in the use of temporary contracts. The diﬃculty lies in isolating these
changes from the eﬀect of the cycle over labor demand. In the Peruvian
case in this particular period, even if it is very probable that the legislative
changes had a large impact on the level and structure of demand, the econ-
omy underwent a very drastic process of structural adjustment (see Saave-
dra 1996a,b). The purpose of this section is to estimate labor demand func-
tions and assess the eﬀect of changes in two speciﬁc regulations in Peru:
ﬁring costs and nonwage costs. In 1991, absolute job stability was elimi-
nated for new hires, and in 1995, after the constitutional change of 1993,
job stability was totally abolished. Severance payments rules were simpli-
ﬁed, and the severance proﬁle was made less steep. This, together with the
reduction in red tape for the use of temporary contracts, implied a drastic
reduction in ﬁring costs in two steps, one in 1991 and the second in 1995.
On the other hand, nonwage costs were increased in 1987 and in 1990, ﬁrst
due to changes in caps and minimums in several contributions, and later
through the increase in FONAVI, a plain payroll tax, and the pension con-
tribution. We limit the analysis to labor demand for the formal sector,
which is precisely the one aﬀected by regulations. However, being formal
(i.e., being in the universe of this study) is endogenous. One of the ﬁrst con-
sequences of high ﬁring and nonwage costs in a low-productivity economy
is informality, so we start the analysis by looking at how informal and for-
mal salaried employment adjusted between 1986 and 1996.
2.3.1 Informality, the First Way to Avoid Regulations
Firms and workers adjust to the labor market regulatory framework
through multiple mechanisms. Job protection legislation and severance
payments constitute ﬁring costs that increase uncertainty about the actual
costs of labor and render labor a quasi-ﬁxed factor. Given the regulatory
framework that prevailed until 1991, Peruvian ﬁrms devised ways to reduce
the costs of adjusting labor to their desired levels. The ﬁrst adjustment
mechanism was—and for many ﬁrms still is—the informal sector. Infor-
mality is conceptualized here as a state chosen by ﬁrms and workers de-
pending on a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Many ﬁrms, typically small ones, oper-
ate totally underground, ﬁre and hire at will, and do not pay any kind of
socially mandated beneﬁts. In most of these cases, their productivity is too
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the worker, any kind of mandated beneﬁt is a luxury. However, many ﬁrms
operate in the gray area. In fact, there is a continuum of ﬁrms with diﬀer-
ent levels of productivity, and there is a cutoﬀ point at which the ﬁrm de-
cides that it has to operate formally. The decision to become formal entails
a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Firms evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of formality
(mandated beneﬁts compliance and a larger volume of business, respec-
tively) against the costs and beneﬁts of informality (ﬁnes adjusted by the
probability of being caught and savings in mandated beneﬁts and ﬁring
costs, respectively).
Given changes in the regulatory framework, the balance in this cost-
beneﬁt analysis determines the evolution of formal and informal salaried
employment. We used data from household surveys and deﬁned formal
salaried workers as those who show signs of working in a ﬁrm that complies
with regulations.10 As shown in ﬁgure 2.4, salaried informal employment
increased since 1987 throughout the period of analysis. However, employ-
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10. Operationally, formal salaried workers were deﬁned as those who had health insurance,
had a retirement plan, or belonged to a union. An application of this deﬁnition is found in
Saavedra and Chong (1999).
Fig. 2.4 Metropolitan Lima: Private formal and informal salaried employment
and GDP, 1986–1997
Source:INEI, Encuesta de Hogares del MTPS 1986–1995, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares del
INEI 1997.ment among formal salaried workers was more responsive to the business
cycle. It fell slightly between 1987 and 1992 and then increased rapidly
since 1993. It could be argued that the rigidities in labor legislation in the
1980s prevented formal employment from falling dramatically. Conversely,
the more ﬂexible environment of the 1990s allowed for a quick employment
expansion. Looking at the shares of formal and informal salaried employ-
ment in total private salaried employment (ﬁgure 2.5), it is clear that the
former fell sharply during the downturn and tended to increase timidly as
output bounced back during the 1990s after the launching of the reforms.
2.3.2 Formal Labor Demand Estimations
Using household surveys, we only have annual data for ten years, so a
formal analysis of the labor demand is not possible. Notwithstanding, it
seems to be clear that, ceteris paribus, as the volume of business falls (as in
1988–1992) the costs of operating formally increase and outweigh the ben-
eﬁts, so more ﬁrms go underground, or more new ﬁrms decide to launch
operations informally rather than formally. As of 1993, output rose again,
and so did productivity; consequently, more ﬁrms should have found it
proﬁtable to operate formally. But to complicate matters, ﬁrms’ decisions
involve increasing or decreasing the share of their payroll that goes under-
ground or not, and other developments also aﬀect this decision. Reduc-
tions in ﬁring costs could have had a positive eﬀect on formal labor de-
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Fig. 2.5 Metropolitan Lima: Share of private formal salaried employment in total
private salaried employment and GDP, 1986–1997 (percentage)
Source:INEI, Encuesta de Hogares del MTPS 1986–1995, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares del
INEI 1997.mand, but at the same time, nonwage labor costs increased, with the op-
posite eﬀect over this demand.
In what follows, and with the purpose of analyzing formally the eﬀects
of these changes, using the quarterly data sets for the formal sector de-
scribed next, we ﬁrst perform static estimations of the labor demand at the
sector level and at the ﬁrm level.11 We show the results of diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations, in which we analyze elasticity of wages, payroll contributions—
taxes, health insurance, and pension and other contributions—and ex-
pected severance payments.
The Data
The main data source used to estimate static and dynamic labor demand
functions for formal ﬁrms in Lima was the Quarterly Survey of Wages and
Salaries (QSWS) conducted by the Ministry of Labor. The QSWS is a quar-
terly ﬁrm survey that collects pooled data on both the ﬁrm and individual
worker levels. This survey collects approximately 600 private ﬁrms of ten or
more workers in Metropolitan Lima (composed of the province of Lima
and the constitutional province of Callao) and 8,000 workers from the
same ﬁrms. The survey is divided into two sections. Part A provides ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information that covers the gross wage bill divided into wage and
nonwage costs, levels of employment, and presence of collective bargain-
ing, each speciﬁed by category of employment (blue collar, white collar,
and executive) and standardized international industrial code (SIIC). In
Part B, ﬁve to twenty-ﬁve workers (according to the size of ﬁrm) from each
ﬁrm are surveyed at random, thus providing individual-level information
on age, gender, tenure, salary breakdown, and speciﬁc occupation, as well
as employment category.
In 1986 the method of sample selection changed from a univariate dis-
tribution to one stratiﬁed across ten categories of economic sector and four
categories of ﬁrm size.12 This methodology ensures adequate representa-
tion of each cross section of ﬁrm sectors and sizes—totaling forty-eight
groups of ﬁrms, among which a multivariate probability distribution is de-
termined according to number of ﬁrms in each group, while minimizing to-
tal wage variance per group with standard optimal sampling methods.13
Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact: Peru 147
11. Using only formal ﬁrms—registered in the Ministry of Labor data sets—generates a se-
lection bias for which we do not control.
12. The survey has been conducted since 1957, although at several points it has undergone
important modiﬁcations. Due to the signiﬁcance of modiﬁcations, data prior to 1986 are in-
appropriate for analytical comparisons with those of later periods. Furthermore, only hard
copy tabulations of data from this period have been preserved.
13. Firms are divided into four size categories: 10–49 workers, 50–99, 100–499, and 500 or
more. The economic sectors are agriculture, mining, manufacture of consumption goods,
manufacture of intermediate and capital goods, utilities, construction, wholesale trade, retail
trade, ﬁnancial activities, insurance and real estate, transportation and communications, and
services. Agricultural ﬁrms have been dropped from the sample.Thus, the extent of survey information useful for analysis is restricted to
the period 1986–1997, which comprises ten years of bimonthly data and
quarterly data since 1996, representing a total of sixty-eight distinct points
in time.14
During 1986 to 1997 there were three diﬀerent samplings of ﬁrms, from
the Ministry of Labor’s “Hoja de Resumen de Planillas” (HRP) of 1986,
1990, and 1994. The HRPs are summary payroll forms that all private for-
mal ﬁrms are legally required to present annually. The degree of compli-
ance is high among large ﬁrms, and the probability of compliance increases
with size. Total number of sampled ﬁrms per period remains around 500,
but they were not replaced if the ﬁrm died or did not report during that pe-
riod. Therefore, for the economic-sector estimations, we pool the data of
all the ﬁrms in each sector and use expansion factors to calculate sector-
level aggregates; we also use part B of the survey to calculate tenure struc-
tures by sector, which we then use for constructing the expected severance
payment variable. With these, we build a pseudo panel at the sector level
with ﬁfty-six time points per sector. In addition to this ﬁrm database, we
constructed time series of gross domestic product (GDP), which varied
yearly by economic sector. To make the sector pseudo panel comparable to
the ﬁrm-level panel described, we divide it into three pseudo subpanels ac-
cording to the sampling dates, 1987–1990, 1991–1994, and 1995–1997. Al-
though they roughly coincide with three distinct periods in terms of labor
legislation (recall that the two main laws were enacted in November 1991
and July 1995) there is variability within periods, particularly regarding
payroll contributions.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of employment of formal ﬁrms in Lima
throughout the period. The gray bars show the periods in which the sample
changed. Using the same data set, we constructed a sample of workers for
each sector in each period. From that sample, we analyzed some basic
worker characteristics. The results conﬁrm the trends observed from house-
hold survey data. In particular, it is found that in the 1990s the propor-
tion of younger workers increases, there is a slight increase in the share of
female employment, and average tenure falls.
Finally, using this 1986–1997 QSWS survey data, we constructed three
ﬁrm-level panels comprising all ﬁrms that remain in the sample set
throughout the subperiods. The panels were constructed according to the
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14. Data from all surveys prior to 1991 were stored only on eight-inch diskettes formatted
with the antiquated XENIX system, which required the use of a Radio Shack TRS-16B com-
puter and an eight-inch hard drive. None of those machines in Peru were in operating condi-
tion. The data were translated into a readable format by a software company based in Indi-
anapolis, and the information was processed in order to recover the shape of the original
databases. Only a few internal documents from the Ministry of Labor prior to 1990 describ-
ing the data existed. Fortunately, the survey did not undergo any methodological changes
during that period, according to several current and former employers of the Direccion Na-











































































































































.sampling periods and identify ﬁrms that remained in the survey through-
out each subperiod. The ﬁrst panel is 1987–1990, and all ﬁrms were drawn
from the 1985 summary payroll forms of formal ﬁrms registered with the
Ministry of Labor. The panel comprises 389 ﬁrms observed during twenty
quarters. The second panel goes from 1991 through 1994, comprising 408
ﬁrms observed during twenty-four periods, drawn from the 1989 payroll
forms. These two panels are the largest due to the fact that ﬁrms were never
resampled from the total population of registered ﬁrms during this period.
In other words, the list of panel observations is altered only by the death of
ﬁrms that were originally sampled, and thus its size is determined solely by
the mortality rate of those ﬁrms. In contrast, between 1995 and 1997, sur-
veyed ﬁrms were resampled yearly from an updated sample set. Despite
this greater variation in sampled observations, our third panel is only
slightly smaller than its earlier counterpart (341 ﬁrms), largely because
both the population (from payroll forms) and sample populations of sur-
veyed ﬁrms have been considerably enlarged in recent years.15
Econometric Labor Demand Speciﬁcations
The objective here is to specify a static labor demand function from
which the impact of diﬀerent regulations may be inferred. We are mainly
interested in analyzing the eﬀect of payroll contributions—taxes on wages
and social security payments—and severance payments on labor demand.
With this objective, we will specify a static labor demand function follow-
ing Hamermesh (1993).
The equations to be estimated will be derived ﬁrst from a proﬁt-
maximizing framework. Consider the following ﬁrm’s proﬁt function:
(1)   F(K, L)   E(w)L   rK,
where K is capital, L is labor, and w and r are the cost of labor and capital,
respectively. E(w), which is the expected cost of labor, is used in order to ac-
count for the expected costs the ﬁrm would incur in the event of layoﬀs.
This is important because win the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is not fully
represented by the observed salaries, making it necessary to add other fac-
tors to appropriately represent the relevant cost per worker (following the
distinction made in Hamermesh 1993).
The problem of the ﬁrm is to choose (K, L) such that it maximizes proﬁt.
(2) max[F(K, L)   E(w)L   rK ],
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15. We attempted the construction of a panel of all ﬁrms that appeared continuously in the
survey data between 1990 and 1997. This panel spanning both subperiods is by far the small-
est, and, given its obvious biases, we will not include it in our estimations. On account of the
fact that in 1995 a new sample of ﬁrms was selected (largely at random) from an updated pay-
roll census for the ﬁrst time since 1991, very few ﬁrms from the 1991–1994 period are resam-
pled in 1995 and reappear continuously in the 1995–1997 sample populations.where
(3) E(w)   w   p   E(sp),
where wis the wage paid to the employee, pis all payroll contributions paid
by the ﬁrm, and E(sp) is a measure of the expected severance payments as
described in section 2.2.
A wide variety of functional forms have been developed in the past de-
cade, although the derived factor demand functions are still analyzed un-
der the same optimizing behavior (Merrilees 1982). The question remains
as to which ﬂexible production function will best suit our hypothesis test-
ing. Here we use one of the approaches proposed in Hamermesh (1986)
and estimate a simple and ﬂexible functional form without any imposition
of the restrictions that factor demand must be homogeneous of degree zero
in all factor prices:
(4) ln Li   a  ∑ bj ln E(wj)i   c ln Yi    Zi,
where jindicates the factor, iindicates the sector or the ﬁrm, wjcorresponds
to two production factor prices, w and r, and Zi is a vector of other ex-
planatory variables at the sector or ﬁrm level. As mentioned by Hamer-
mesh (1993), equation (4) should be viewed as part of a complete system of
factor-demand equations, but given that we do not have data on all factors
it is not possible to estimate a complete system.
Our initial objective is to see the eﬀect of changes in labor regulations
over labor demand in the formal sector of the economy. We analyze how
labor cost elasticity changes as we add payroll contributions and the ex-
pected severance payment in a marginal productivity condition. We do not
attempt to estimate labor supply relationships under the plausible as-
sumption that the labor supply to the formal sector, in an economy with a
very large informal sector, tends to be nearly horizontal. We estimate two
variants of equation (4) that measure the eﬀects of the diﬀerent compo-
nents of labor costs over employment:
(5) ln Li   a   b1 ln wi   b2 ln E(sp)i   c ln Yi    Zi
(5 )l n Li   a   b1 ln(wi   pi)   b2 ln E(sp)i   c ln Yi    Zi
In equation (5) we include the average wage of the sector or ﬁrm and the
expected severance payment as the two main labor costs. In equation (5 )
we add to the average wage the average nonwage costs (public and private
pension contributions, health contributions, accident insurance, etc.; see
section 2.2.3) mandated by law that the employer had to pay in addition to
the wage. These contributions are added to the salary because they are
monthly charges paid by the employer, in contrast to the expected sever-
ance payment, which depends on the tenure structure of the employees.
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aggregated data and ﬁrm-level data with our three panels of the Peruvian
ﬁrms (1987–1990, 1991–1994, and 1995–1997).16Following a modiﬁed ver-
sion of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), the econometric speciﬁcation of
labor demand is
(6) ln Li,t   a   b1 ln[wi,t   pi,t]   b2 ln E(sp)i,t   c ln Y ˆ
t L   d ln L ˆ
i,t L
  e ln L ˆ
i,t L   ln E(sp)i,t    t    Zi,t   εi,t,
where wages (w) and payroll taxes (p) represent the labor costs, E(sp) rep-
resents the expected severance payments, Y ˆ is the quarterly output by eco-
nomic sector as a proxy of ﬁrm output—instrumentalized with the lag—
L ˆ
t–L is the number of workers in the previous period instrumentalized with
the rolling regressions technique and using one- to four-period lagged em-
ployment, and t is a time trend.
Lagged employment is also included to measure the speed of adjustment
to changes in output. The coeﬃcient of this variable can lie between zero
and 1; a large value is associated with a slower speed of adjustment, and a
small value implies that the adjustment is instantaneous.
Finally, following Burgess and Dolado (1989), we try to measure the ad-
justment costs of changes in employment by including the interaction be-
tween lagged employment and expected severance payment as the main ﬁr-
ing costs. The coeﬃcient of this interaction measures whether there are
increasing marginal costs of changing employment, and therefore a posi-
tive coeﬃcient is expected.
Empirical Results
Using quarterly data for ten economic sectors observed between 1987
and 1997, we estimated the constant output labor demand wage elasticity
for equations (5) and (5 ).17 As can be observed in table 2.4, all the compo-
nents of E(w) from equation (3) are signiﬁcant and have the expected neg-
ative sign when included individually. The estimate of –0.19 for the labor
demand wage elasticity (in the model in which labor costs included wages
plus payroll contributions [b]) lies within the typical range for static labor
demands using sector data (Hamermesh 1986, 1993).18
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16. As mentioned before, the periods roughly coincide with three diﬀerent legislation
regimes.
17. This estimation is only done for the sector pseudo panel and not for the ﬁrms panel be-
cause we cannot generate a panel for the whole time period (1987–1997) given the structure
of the survey.
18. As a sensitivity test, we also carry out a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) esti-
mation, which included a proxy of the price of capital. The results of the CES speciﬁcation
were an elasticity of –0.13 for the wage and payroll cost variable and a positive elasticity for
the price of capital. The latter reﬂects the positive cross-price elasticity of demand due to sub-
stitutability of labor for capital in production. Finally, the coeﬃcient for the expected sever-
ance payment was –0.221.Moreover, as hypothesized, the coeﬃcient of the average wage paid by
the employer (b1) is smaller by two points than the coeﬃcient of the aver-
age wage plus all the payroll costs paid by the ﬁrm (b  1). Therefore, as we in-
clude payroll taxes, the employment response to changes in labor costs in-
creases. Additionally, we carried out an encompassing test on the model ﬁt
to select which speciﬁcation should be used. We used a nonnested proce-
dure and a Cox test for nonnested hypothesis (Greene 1997), and we were
able to choose equation (5 ) where ln(w   p) is used as the correct set of re-
gressors. The Cox test, in which the null hypothesis was that equation (5)
contained the correct set of regressors, was rejected with a p-value of 0.000
(Cox statistic   5.27). On the other hand, when the null was that equation
(5 ) contained the correct set of regressors, we could not reject it at any sig-
niﬁcance level (Cox statistic   3.56).
On the other hand, the coeﬃcient of the expected severance payment,
which varies across sectors and along time, also has the expected negative
sign and is signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level. This gives us evidence that the
reduction in ﬁring costs has a positive eﬀect on employment level. Regard-
ing the output elasticity, the coeﬃcient for the whole period is around 0.05.
This is a very small coeﬃcient because in the models presented in table 2.4
we are including ﬁxed eﬀects by sector absorbing most of its variation—
which is mainly across sectors rather than within. Speciﬁcally, when run-
ning the regressions without ﬁxed eﬀects the output elasticity is 0.17 and
signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level. We included the log of Yi lagged six
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Table 2.4 Constant Output Labor Demand Estimation: Sector-Level Estimation
(1987–1997)











Log likelihood –183.22 –182.97
 2(9) 1,083.01∗∗∗ 1,084.59∗∗∗
No. of observations 504 504
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.months, because the correlation between the errors and the actual output
level that results from measurement error also biases ordinary least squares
(OLS) output elasticity toward zero, and output measurement error can
also bias the estimates of own-price elasticities. Griliches and Hausman
(1986) demonstrate that when panel data are available, lead or lag of a vari-
able subject to measurement error may be an appropriate instrumental
variable. On the other hand, we are assuming that ﬁrms will not adjust im-
mediately to changes in labor regulation, especially given the preexisting
rigidities explained earlier.
Table 2.5 reports the results of equation (6), at both the sector and ﬁrm
level, for the three subperiods determined by changes in the sample of
ﬁrms: 1987–1990, 1991–1994, and 1995–1996. The ﬁrst three columns are
the results for the sectoral-level panels, and the last three columns show the
results for the three ﬁrm-level panels. The variables used are the ones in-
cluded in equation (5 ) plus the instrumentalized lagged employment19 as
a measure of adjustment costs, its interaction with the expected severance
payment, and a time trend. For the estimations we apply generalized least
squares and correct for serial correlation with a correlation coeﬃcient spe-
ciﬁc for each panel when needed. For the sector panel we include and test
for sector ﬁxed eﬀects.20
In four out of six cases wage elasticities are negative and signiﬁcant. Un-
fortunately, there are two exceptions: ﬁrst at the sector level, for the ﬁrst pe-
riod in which the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, and ﬁnally in the
second subperiod on the ﬁrm-level data. It should be noted that variations
in the measured price of labor may be the spurious result of shifts in the dis-
tribution of employment among subaggregates with diﬀerent labor costs,
as mentioned by Hamermesh (1986). It is diﬃcult, however, to determine
the extent of these potential problems. Regarding the expected severance
payment, we found that in the ﬁrst subperiod this variable had a negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, –0.89 at the sector level and –0.31 at the ﬁrm
level. In the last subperiod, the coeﬃcient reduces to –0.31 at the sector
level and to –0.14 at the ﬁrm level, losing its signiﬁcance in both cases.21
This result may be related to the fact that after 1995 there was not enough
time variability in ﬁring costs within the subperiod to establish an eﬀect
over the employment level, or that the variance of within-ﬁrm tenure struc-
tures had already fallen, reducing diﬀerences in expected severance pay-
ments across ﬁrms. In the ﬁrm panel data set, the interaction of the
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19. This variable is instrumentalized using the rolling regressions technique with one- to
four-period lagged employment.
20. We did not include ﬁxed eﬀects for the ﬁrm-level estimations because both the expected
severance payment and the GDP were available only at the sectoral, and not at the ﬁrm, level.
21. We were not able to get evidence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these
and other parameters when comparing diﬀerent subperiods, using Wald tests. The limitation
of these tests is that we assume that they are independent random samples, which is not true,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.expected severance payment with the lag of employment, a measure of the
marginal cost of changing employment, has a small but signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient that decreases over time.
In the sector-level estimations, the output elasticity increases from the
ﬁrst to the last subperiod, as shown in table 2.5. During the ﬁrst subperiod
it is 0.014 and not signiﬁcant, while in the last subperiod it is 0.09 and sig-
niﬁcant at the 90 percent level.22 This increase in output elasticity may be
related to the fact that labor reforms made it easier for ﬁrms to adjust to
the desired employment levels given changes in output. Given the lower
level of the tax on dismissals generated by the reduction in severance pay-
ments and the abolition of job stability rights, and also given the lower ad-
ministrative costs of using temporary contracts, formal ﬁrms enjoyed more
ﬂexibility in adapting to output changes. As shown in section 2.2, available
evidence suggests that most of the increase in formal employment during
the period seems to have been concentrated in temporary contracts. Nev-
ertheless, this fact might also introduce a bias in the estimates, as our data
aggregate employment and wages for both permanent and temporary con-
tracts, and the true estimate for each of them might be diﬀerent. This prob-
lem is dragged to the ﬁrm-level panel estimations also.23 Output coeﬃ-
cients in this case are only signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst subperiod. It should be
noted, however, that the output variable is deﬁned at the sectoral level, so
the coeﬃcient cannot be interpreted as ﬁrm-level employment elasticity.
The lagged employment was included to measure whether adjustment
occurs instantaneously. As shown in table 2.5, the eﬀect of this variable is
only signiﬁcant in the ﬁrm-level panels with coeﬃcients ranging between
0.62 and 0.94. The magnitudes of these coeﬃcients are within the range of
the coeﬃcients found by Abraham and Houseman (1994). Given that this
is bimonthly data, a fall from 0.7 in the late 1980s to 0.6 in the mid-1990s
would imply a reduction in the median adjustment—as, for example, from
six to four quarters. The smaller coeﬃcient in the last period could suggest
an increase in the ﬂexibility of the labor market that made it easier to re-
duce workforce levels during periods of slack demand as well as making
employers more willing to hire during periods of rising demand. The speed
of adjustment is, however, much lower than the one observed in the United
States as reported by Abraham and Houseman (1994).24
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22. It is important to mention that the coeﬃcient is small because these models include sec-
tor ﬁxed eﬀects, but, despite this, in the last subperiod the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant. If we ex-
clude the ﬁxed eﬀects the coeﬃcient is around 0.17.
23. Finally, appendix A tests for the implication that total labor demand should vary over
the cycle due to employment composition changes (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992). When in-
teracting the regressors with the cycle dummy to capture responses to the business cycles, the
eﬀects were not signiﬁcant in practically all of our regressions, as shown in table 2A.1.
24. These authors report a speed of adjustment for the U.S. manufacturing sector of 0.383.
On the other hand, the speeds of adjustment for West Germany, France, and Belgium were
similar to our results: 0.837, 0.935, and 0.823, respectively.2.4 Eﬀects on Duration and Turnover of Changes in Labor Legislation
In this section, we analyze basic patterns of employment duration in
Peru. We address the question of how long jobs last in Peru, if their dura-
tion is diﬀerent in the formal and informal sectors and in diﬀerent occu-
pations, and if there are signiﬁcant changes related to changes in labor
legislation. Reductions in labor legislation–related ﬁrings costs—like the
ones observed in Peru in the early 1990s through the reduction in sever-
ance payments and the abolition of job stability rights—typically acceler-
ate the process of job creation and job destruction, therefore increasing
turnover and reducing job duration, particularly in the formal sector. This
is consistent with Lindbeck and Snower’s (2002) insider-outsider theory, in
which they maintain that labor turnover costs are important only in labor
markets that are characterized by stringent job security legislation, such as
Peru had. Moreover, the Peruvian reforms facilitated the use of temporary
contracts. This had the eﬀect of inducing ﬁrms to hire more during ex-
pansions and also to lay oﬀ more workers during downturns, which im-
plies an increase in turnover. Using diﬀerent data sets, we ﬁnd a reduction
in employment duration that cannot be explained only by cyclical move-
ments of the economy. Using empirical hazards, we compare job duration
and employment exit patterns of the self-employed with those of wage
earners in the formal and informal sectors, and we also try to analyze the
eﬀects of certain regulations over duration patterns and their changes over
time.
We ﬁrst present trends in job duration using the series of ten annual
household surveys from the Ministry of Labor. The main shortcoming of
this source is that it only provides us with data on incomplete (elapsed)
tenures. However, as long as we are precise about what we are measuring,
we can exploit the fact that it allows us to analyze some time series and
cross-sectional variations. Then we present empirical hazards and the re-
sults of exponential hazard models using data from the Living Standards
Measurement Survey, which has the advantage of providing us with an
(unfortunately) small sample of complete employment durations.
2.4.1 Analysis of Recent Trends Using Censored Data on Job Duration
We ﬁrst analyze a repeated cross-sectional data set, the Annual House-
hold Survey of the Ministry of Labor for all the years between 1986 and
1997, with the exception of 1988. This survey collects information regard-
ing job characteristics and elapsed tenure in the case of the employed and
time in unemployment for the unemployed. In the case of these surveys, the
question is “How long have you been in your current job?” The data are
recorded in years and months. The answer does not provide information on
the length of a particular contract but only on a match between ﬁrm and
employee. In the case of the self-employed, this question relates to the time
Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact: Peru 157performing the same occupation. All elapsed tenures refer to the main
job.25
The data available from these surveys are reported as incomplete
tenures. Following Lancaster (1990), we can assume that, given a proba-
bility density function (PDF) of complete tenures for a sample of the stock
of employed workers, there is a related PDF for elapsed tenures. Moreover,
it is possible to assume that for workers with some labor market history, the
PDF of remaining duration is the same as for the elapsed duration. There-
fore, the expected value of completed durations is double the expected
value of incomplete (elapsed) durations. This will be true as long as the
stationarity of the process is assured; that is, it may not be true for young
workers starting their careers, women who enter and reenter the labor
market, or older workers approaching retirement (Burgess and Rees 1996).
Clearly, these data allow the analysis of the distribution of tenures among
those employed at the time of the survey, but not the distributions of jobs.
Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show mean elapsed tenures for several cate-
gories of prime-age workers (twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve years old). In general,
it is clear that there is a downward trend in mean tenure. The trend is clear
enough to dominate any possible cyclical ﬂuctuations in tenure. During the
sharp recession of 1988–1992, when an increase in mean tenure could be
expected due to high separation rates and low hiring rates, mean tenure ac-
tually fell. Tenure rose only in 1991, when the Peruvian economy hit bot-
tom.26 In 1992–1993, right after the ﬁrst changes in labor legislation, there
was a sharp reduction in mean tenure. During the period 1994–1997 growth
was fast, and hiring and separation rates increased, as usually happens in
a booming economy, resulting in a further reduction in mean tenure. How-
ever, the 1997 ﬁgure was much lower than in 1986–1987, when the economy
was also on an upswing. This gives an indication that the reduction in ten-
ures may not be only a cyclical ﬂuctuation but that it might be showing a
secular trend.
The downward trend is clearer among prime-age males (ﬁgure 2.7).
Given that the mean value of complete tenures should be about double the
elapsed ones, in the mid-1990s mean completed tenure was about twelve
years,27down from seventeen years in the mid-1980s. There is also a reduc-
tion in mean tenure among females (not shown), but it is harder to assume
a stationary process in this case. First, because of maternity women enter
and reenter the labor market, and second, during this period there is a
rapid increase in labor force participation among women (Saavedra 1998).
158 Jaime Saavedra and Máximo Torero
25. In all surveys and years, the proportion of workers who declare having a second job ﬂuc-
tuates between 12 percent and 15 percent.
26. Tabulations not reported show that there is no clear trend in mean tenure among young
workers.
27. Considering that the average schooling for males in Lima in this cohort is 8.5, and as-
suming retirement at 65, on average, each individual holds three jobs during his lifetime.The diﬀerences in means between 1986 and 1991 and between 1991 and
1997 are statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of mean elapsed tenures for prime-age
male wage earners according to their formal or informal status. To deﬁne
this status we use a legalistic deﬁnition: A worker works formally if he or
she has health insurance or a pension plan or belongs to a union. The same
deﬁnition is used in all the surveys. With this deﬁnition, the rate of formal
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Fig. 2.7 Metropolitan Lima: Incomplete (elapsed) tenure of male and female
workers aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve years, 1986–1997
Fig. 2.8 Metropolitan Lima: Incomplete (elapsed) tenure of formal and informal
male salaried private workers aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve years, 1986–1997employment ﬂuctuated from 53 percent to 60 percent between 1986 and
1997. Several features are worth mentioning. Diﬀerences in mean elapsed
tenures are large between formal and informal salaried workers. In fact, for
formal salaried workers, mean tenure is between 9 and 6.8 years, while for
informal workers, the mean ﬂuctuates around 3. This diﬀerence is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in every year during the period 1986–1997, as shown in
table 2.6.
The downward trend is more pronounced among formal workers,28 in
particular after 1991. Table 2.7 (panel A) shows tenure mean comparisons
within formal and informal workers pairing diﬀerent years. Within infor-
mal workers there is a signiﬁcant reduction in mean tenure in the period
1986–1993 and a smaller and less signiﬁcant reduction in the period 1993–
1997. In the case of formal workers the fall is much larger and statistically
signiﬁcant in the postreforms period. From the results shown in panel B of
table 2.7, it is clear that the diﬀerences in mean tenures between the formal
and informal sectors have fallen during the 1990s. As discussed earlier, la-
bor market reforms facilitated formal ﬁrms’ adjustment to desired em-
ployment levels through temporary contracts and by reducing severance
payments and eliminating job stability. In addition, unionization rates fell
sharply, and union jobs have traditionally been held much longer than
nonunion ones.
Figure 2.9 displays elapsed mean tenure calculations for prime-age for-
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Fig. 2.9 Metropolitan Lima: Incomplete (elapsed) tenure of male formal workers
in selected economic sectors aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve years, 1986–1997
28. Tabulations not reported for self-employed workers show a downward trend among for-
mal self-employed workers, but not among informal self-employed.mal male salaried workers in selected sectors. In the manufacturing sector,
there is a smooth upward trend between 1988 and 1990, as the economy fell
into a recession. Afterward, mean tenure falls as the economy picks up. We
observe the same trend in services and, to a lesser extent, in trade. We also
performed calculations controlling for age structure, and results were sim-
ilar, which tends to suggest that these changes are not reﬂecting changes in
the type of workers being ﬁred but are an illustration of higher overall
turnover.
Several factors may lie behind the reduction in tenure among formal
prime-age workers. Before the reforms, high ﬁring costs induced long em-
ployment spells among formal workers, but they also induced a lower rate
of job creation in the formal sector, which also increased the relative size of
the informal sector. The labor market reforms of 1991 facilitated an increase
in hiring through temporary contracts and also reduced ﬁring costs through
a reduction in the severance payment and the elimination of job stability
for new workers. The reforms were followed by an economic expansion
Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact: Peru 161












Notes: H: (Informal worker tenure in period t – Formal worker tenure in period t)   0. In all
years the p-value was 0.000.








Formal – Informal 0.48 –1.60
(0.75) (0.67)
Notes: Diﬀerences of mean elapsed tenure for currently employed wage earners in Metropol-
itan Lima. Standard errors in parentheses.that began in 1993 and increased employment, both formal and informal.
The increase in net employment suggests that hirings were larger than lay-
oﬀs. Layoﬀs in the private sector—also driven by trade liberalization and
privatizations—were larger among older workers.29 On one hand, the rela-
tive cost of ﬁring a high-tenured worker fell tremendously with the reforms,
in particular with the 1995 changes, when job stability was abolished for all
workers. On the other hand, the increase in the demand for labor was larger
for younger workers, who could more easily adapt to new technologies.
Therefore, layoﬀs were biased toward older workers, while hirings were bi-
ased toward younger ones, with the eﬀect of reducing mean tenures.
Table 2.8 shows mean job durations using elapsed-tenure data from sev-
eral sources. The ﬁrst two columns are from the same data sets discussed in
the previous paragraphs, the third comes from the ﬁrm-level survey used in
the labor demand analysis, and the rest are from the Living Standards
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) described in the following section. All data
sources conﬁrm a reduction in mean tenure for formal workers during the
1990s.
2.4.2 The Duration of Employment Spells
The data used in this part of the analysis come from the LSMS.30The em-
ployment modules of the LSMS contain information about job character-
istics like tenure in the current job, sector of activity, size of ﬁrm, whether
contract was signed, union membership, type of employment (public/
private/self-employed/wage earner), white- or blue-collar job, and so
forth.31 This information is collected regarding the job held in the previous
seven days. In addition, individuals who are not working report whether
they are looking for a job and number of weeks unemployed. The survey
has another module that asks workers—either employed or unemployed—
questions regarding their last job in the previous twelve months. If the
worker has been unemployed during the last seven days, the survey asks for
all the characteristics of the last job held during the previous year. If he or
she has been working during the last seven days, the survey inquires if this
job is the one held during the last seven days. If the job is diﬀerent, the sur-
vey asks for the characteristics of that job. Two types of job spells are cal-
culated with each survey. We use each survey separately and calculate right-
censored spells for the sampled stock of employed workers and complete
spells for the unemployed and for those who changed jobs during the last
year. The detail of the duration data is as follows:
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29. Saavedra (1998) shows that among workers older than 55, the employment-population
ratio has not recovered with the employment growth observed in the 1990s and that unem-
ployment has risen for this group of workers.
30. The LSMSs are a series of household surveys developed since 1985 under the technical
and ﬁnancial support of the World Bank and later implemented by Instituto Cuanto.
31. Sample sizes allow for the analysis of all these categories separately. As opposed to what
is observed in developed economies, in Peru, as in other Latin American countries, self-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.• We use right-censored spells for the stock of people currently working,
using the question “How long have you been working as [occupa-
tion]?” (coded in weeks, months and years).32
• For those who declare that they have indeed changed jobs during the
last twelve months, we construct two spells, a right-censored spell of
less than twelve months and a complete previous spell. These data
have two obvious biases. First, we have complete spells only for those
who changed jobs during the last twelve months; if the current spell
lasts more than that, we have no information about the previous spell.
For these movers, we do not have information on possible unemploy-
ment periods between the two jobs. Second, for some workers who re-
port a change in job, the change is within a ﬁrm. In those cases, we will
not count that as a job change. We will isolate those cases by compar-
ing all the job characteristics of the previous and current spells (occu-
pation, sector, size of ﬁrm, public or private, etc.).
• We use complete job spell for those who are not currently employed
and who answer positively to the question “Have you had a diﬀerent
job during the last twelve months?”33
The complete and incomplete employment spells that are constructed in
our data sets are summarized in ﬁgure 2.10. According to the employment
duration data for the years 1985 and 1994 from the LSMS, 78 percent of
the job durations of 1985 are incomplete spells, while for the 1994 sample
this ﬁgure is 86 percent.
We  analyze the basic diﬀerences in job duration patterns using the
LSMS employment duration data for the years 1985 and 1994, including
both complete and incomplete employment spells. These spells are to be
thought of as independent realizations of a random variable T with sur-
vivor function F  (t). Using the complete and incomplete employment spells
from the LSMS data, we use the Kaplan Meier estimator for the survivor
function. Following Lancaster (1985), for homogeneous right-censored
data the survivor function at t can be estimated by
(7) F   ˆ(t)   
t( j) t
(1    ˆ
j), t   0,
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32. The question, as written in the questionnaire, does not look very precise. However, two
elements allow us to recognize them as job spells. First, personnel in charge of the ﬁeldwork
and of the interviewer’s training process maintain that they insisted that the duration reported
as an answer to that question should be the length of time working in a speciﬁc occupation
and in a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Second, the survey allows for a second check mechanism from a sepa-
rate question: “What was your main occupation during the last twelve months? Was this the
same as your occupation during the last seven days?” In this case, the interviewer manual in-
dicates that even a change in position within a ﬁrm should be considered a job change. If the
respondent answers that the job was diﬀerent, then he or she will answer for the characteris-
tics of that previous job.
33. Note that we only have spells for those people—current unemployed or out of the la-
bor force—that had a job during the last twelve months. For those unemployed or inactive

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.for   ˆ
j   nj/r j, where nj is the number of employment spells—possible only
one—observed to end at time t, and r j is the risk set (spells that end at time
t plus those censored at time t).  t is the probability of leaving the employ-
ment state (i.e., it is the hazard at time t). This estimator is a step function
with steps at each observed (uncensored) exit time.
A shortcoming of this data set is that with the observational scheme of
the survey complete spells are registered only for workers who are unem-
ployed or out of the labor force and for workers who changed jobs during
the year prior to the survey. Therefore, complete employment spell tenures
are available only for a speciﬁc type of individual. However, as shown in
appendix C, there is a similarity between the hazard function calculated us-
ing only the complete spells and the hazard function estimated using only
the incomplete (censored) spells—as if they were completed despite the
possible biases of the censored data.
In addition, the empirical analysis assumes a stationary economic envi-
ronment. This assumption, which implies that the numbers of jobs created
and destroyed are independent of time, allows to use each survey as a pho-
tograph of the distribution of their hazards assuming they will not be
aﬀected by the passage of time. It is diﬃcult to assume stationarity in the
Peruvian case, in particular, given the implementation of a set of structural
reforms in the early 1990s. However, if we analyze each survey separately
(1985 and 1994), despite the huge macro shocks observed in the Peruvian
economy, no clear pattern of steady increase in the rate of job creation has
been observed in the years previous to the surveys. In fact, a typical vari-
able that could be used to condition the hazard function to the diﬀerent en-
vironments confronted by diﬀerent cohorts at their entry to or exit from
employment is the rate of unemployment. That variable has ﬂuctuated
around a steady mean of 8.5 percent since 1974. Still, it is diﬃcult to assure
that a stationarity assumption can hold in volatile economies like Peru, in
particular in the case of employment spells when we would need the same
data generation process for a relatively long time.
Monthly hazards for a sample of censored and complete spells allow us
to investigate duration patterns at the early stages of a job. In most of the
cases there are spikes at months three, six, and twelve, which (at least in
part) may be a heaping eﬀect. In this sense, it will be important to compare
changes through time and between categories. At the time of the ﬁeldwork
of the 1985 survey, the probationary period lasted three years, after which
workers acquired total job stability. However, the authorities had already
announced their intention of giving workers job stability rights after the
third month.34 In fact, the hazard function calculated with 1985 data for
spells that started after 1983 and before June 1986 (left panel of ﬁgure 2.11)
shows a spike at the third month. It is possible that employers in the formal
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34. The change was actually put into eﬀect in June 1986.Fig. 2.11 Empirical hazards for formal public and private workers with less than
three years of tenure (employment duration in months)sector had already reacted to the announcement by dismissing workers
right before they reached that tenure length. However, this spike is even
larger among informal wage earners, who were not aﬀected by regulations.
In 1994, labor legislation was more ﬂexible, although only a few years
had passed since the ﬁrst wave of labor reforms in 1991. The probationary
period was still three months, after which workers hired after 1991 ob-
tained not job stability but only the right to a severance payment upon un-
just dismissal. Therefore, ﬁring costs were obviously lower than those per-
ceived by ﬁrms in 1985. As shown in the right panel of ﬁgure 2.12, even if
there is still a spike at the third month in 1994, the diﬀerence in the hazard
functions between formal and informal workers is much smaller until the
fourth month. Moreover, for tenures between ﬁve and eleven months the
probability of leaving the state of employment is actually larger for formal
workers than for informal ones. The hazard function for formal wage earn-
ers in 1994 is slightly above that for 1985. These higher hazards for formal
workers in the postreform year may be related to the lower ﬁring costs.
They could also be related to an increased inﬂow of employment, but, as
shown in section 2.2, inﬂows to informal employment were at least as great
as those in the formal sector.
Note that in 1994 there still are large spikes in months 3 and 6. The spike
in the third month may be explained by the fact that at that point workers
acquired the right to a severance payment upon dismissal.35 In addition,
during this period employers still feared a possible reversal of the legisla-
tive changes and a return to a restrictive legislation, so many of them were
still reluctant to hire workers under permanent contracts. They relied heav-
ily on temporary contracts for short-term periods, usually three or six
months, which in some cases were continually renewed.36 There is a large
spike at the twelfth month that may be related to the increase in the sever-
ance payment from zero to three months’ wages after completing a year in
the ﬁrm, so right before ﬁnishing that year ﬁrms had their last chance to
dismiss the worker at zero cost. To summarize, there is an increase in the
hazard function for formal wage earners between 1985 and 1994 and an in-
crease in the hazard relative to that in the informal sector for workers with
short durations.
An additional piece of evidence comes from the comparison between
public and private formal wage earners. As shown in ﬁgure 2.11, there is a
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35. The severance payment rule in 1994 stated that workers should get the equivalent of one
month’s salary per year worked if they had more than one year in the ﬁrm—with a minimum
of three months’ wages and a maximum of twelve months’ wages. They acquired that right af-
ter the three-month probationary period, but the severance payments between the third and
twelfth month were zero.
36. The spike in the third month observed in the informal sector may be a rounding eﬀect
or may also be some sort of “lighthouse eﬀect.”Fig. 2.12 Empirical hazards for wage earners and self-employed workers with less
than three years of tenure (employment duration in months)large spike in the third and sixth month for private formal workers, which
is not observed for public workers. This could be consistent with ﬁrms’ re-
hiring workers for two consecutive probationary periods. In general, the
probability of exiting the employment state is much higher during the ﬁrst
months in the private sector, something that is not observed in the public
sector. Spikes are also observed at one year of tenure, which is consistent
with the increase in severance payment at that point in accordance with
legislation. In 1994, however, the spike is smaller in the private sector and
much lower for the public sector. This is probably related to the reduction
in severance payment in the case of the private sector and to the public-
sector downsizing that started in 1992.
An interesting change is observed when we compare hazards of blue-
collar and white-collar workers. Clearly, during the ﬁrst ten months of em-
ployment, hazards are higher for blue-collar workers, a result consistent
with the common view that turnover is higher among those workers (see
ﬁgure 2.13). In 1985, spikes at the third, sixth, and eighth months are very
pronounced for blue-collar workers and are not observed among white-
collars. However, after 1991, the spikes are observed in both groups, and,
in general, diﬀerences in the hazard functions are much smaller.
Parametric Estimation of Hazard Functions
The sample employment spells just analyzed are not drawn from a ho-
mogeneous population. In order to adjust for the heterogeneity of obser-
vations and analyze patterns for diﬀerent groups of workers, we estimate
exponential hazard models using complete and incomplete spells. Table 2.9
shows the result of the estimation for three diﬀerent years using employ-
ment spells of self-employed and salaried workers. Age shows the usual
negative eﬀect over the hazard, suggesting a lower turnover for older work-
ers. The negative eﬀect of age over the hazard is larger in 1991 and 1994,
consistent with an increase in turnover among older workers. Education has
a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient, suggesting lower hazards for the more ed-
ucated, particularly after the reforms launched in 1991. Surprisingly, occu-
pational training increases hazards in 1991. The results also conﬁrm that
the self-employed have lower hazards and much longer employment spells
than formal wage earners, and that these in turn have longer spells than in-
formal wage earners, the category of control. The negative coeﬃcient for
formal salaried workers is larger after the reforms, suggesting a relative in-
crease in turnover for this group. However, the standard error is also larger,
so the change may not be statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2.10 presents an extended model that limits the sample to wage
earners. The 1985 estimates show that having a temporary contract in-
creases the hazard, suggesting higher turnover among these workers. This
eﬀect disappears by 1994, although temporary contracts were intensively
used, which may be related to a smaller diﬀerence in status within a ﬁrm
170 Jaime Saavedra and Máximo ToreroFig. 2.13 Empirical hazards for wage earners (blue-collar and white-collar) with
less than three years of tenure (employment duration in months)between temporary and permanent positions.37 Having social security cov-
erage, a clear indication of formality, reduces the hazard rate, a result con-
sistent with the higher empirical hazards found before for informal workers.
Surprisingly, belonging to a private-sector union increases the hazard; how-
ever, as the inﬂuence of unions vanishes through time, the estimate for this
variable is not signiﬁcant during the 1990s. We also ﬁnd that married work-
ers tend to have longer employment spells, and hazards are larger for blue-
collar workers, as was suggested in the empirical hazard analysis. Limiting
the sample only to private workers does not modify the result signiﬁcantly.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Peru is one of the countries that made more progress in terms of labor
market deregulation in Latin America as part of a package of structural re-
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Table 2.9 Exponential Hazard Model: Self-Employed and Wage Earners Sample
1985 1991 1994
Male –0.462∗∗∗ –0.212∗∗ –0.293∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.103) (0.092)
Age –0.154∗∗∗ –0.203∗∗∗ –0.183∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.017)
Age2   10–2 0.111∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.020)
Married –0.348∗∗∗ –0.351∗∗∗ –0.048
(0.074) (0.124) (0.107)
Years of schooling –0.005 –0.054∗∗∗ –0.023∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
Occupational training 0.073 0.480∗∗∗ 0.075
(0.069) (0.105) (0.101)






No. of observations 6,144 3,570 4,561
Log likelihood –4,461.59 –1,788.78 –2,656.25
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
37. Saavedra and Maruyama (1999) show that before the reforms temporary workers
tended to be younger, less experienced, and less educated than permanent ones. These diﬀer-
ences diminished sharply after the reforms. Also, there was a signiﬁcant reduction in the earn-
ing premia of permanent workers.forms that took place in the 1990s. One of the most important changes in
labor legislation was the large reduction in ﬁring costs, through the reduc-
tion in the steepness of the tenure-related severance payment proﬁle since
1991, the progressive abolition of job stability, and the facilities given to the
use of temporary contracts. To analyze the eﬀect of changes in ﬁring costs
we constructed an expected severance payment indicator as a proxy of the
monetary resources ﬁrms have to reserve in order to cover ﬁring costs. We
broke down the data into state-contingent components of ﬁring and hiring
states of the economy. Within each state, the severance payment was cal-
culated by sector using the evolution of the tenure structure of workers, an
estimate of the ﬁring probability for each tenure group, and the correspon-
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Table 2.10 Exponential Hazard Model: Wage Earners Sample
1985 1991 1994
Male –0.702∗∗∗ –0.293∗∗ –0.517∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.139) (0.134)
Age –0.175∗∗∗ –0.222∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.030) (0.032)
Age2   10–2 0.146∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.037) (0.041)
Married –0.355∗∗∗ –0.463∗∗∗ –0.010
(0.096) (0.164) (0.139)
Years of schooling 0.050∗∗∗ 0.010 0.029
(0.012) (0.022) (0.019)
Occupational training –0.049 0.544∗∗∗ –0.068
(0.088) (0.139) (0.145)
Union 0.350∗∗ 0.128 –0.303
(0.137) (0.197) (0.272)
Social security –1.180∗∗∗ –1.212∗∗∗ –1.219∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.171) (0.170)
Temporary contract 0.182∗ 0.157
(0.104) (0.143)
Public worker –0.362∗∗ –0.188 –0.484∗∗
(0.157) (0.274) (0.221)
Blue collar worker 0.393∗∗∗ 0.269∗ 0.288∗∗
(0.103) (0.156) (0.146)
Union   public worker 0.019 –0.107 0.535
(0.200) (0.338) (0.376)
No. of observations 3,344 1,945 2,330
Log likelihood –2,557.92 –1,039.92 –1,481.19
 2(df) 1,171.71 517.49 592.49
Prob    2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ding mandated severance payment structure. These probabilities were al-
lowed to vary only across sectors and were kept constant through time in
order to reduce endogeneity. A series of nonwage costs was calculated by
simulating the total labor costs paid by the ﬁrm as a proportion of the wage
for diﬀerent wage levels. This was necessary because several mandated
beneﬁts and the payroll tax had absolute lower and upper bounds that were
continuously changed. In many cases, most of the changes in the eﬀective
rate paid were due to changes in these limits.
To analyze the eﬀects of changes in labor costs and ﬁring over labor de-
mand, we used a pseudo-panel data set of ten economic sectors observed
bimonthly during the period 1987–1997 and three shorter panels of about
400 ﬁrms for the periods 1987–1990, 1991–1994, and 1995–1997. There are
four main empirical ﬁndings. The wage plus payroll elasticity is –0.19 for
the whole period of study when using the sectoral-level panel. This price
elasticity is larger when the payroll taxes are added as part of the labor
costs than in an estimation in which only wages are included, and we were
able to test that the latter was the model that should be used. In most of the
subperiods, at both the sector and ﬁrm levels, labor costs have a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect over labor demand. Labor demand elasticities may
not be stable as the economy opens up, as happened in Peru with the trade
liberalization process that started in 1991. However, Saavedra and Torero
(2001) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in elasticities when interacted with
proxies for changes in the trade regime.
The second main ﬁnding is that the coeﬃcient of our measure of ﬁring
costs, the expected severance payment, is negative and signiﬁcant, showing
that job security provisions have a negative eﬀect on employment. We also
found that its magnitude decreases after 1995. This result may be related to
the fact that after that year there was not enough time variability in ﬁring
costs within the subperiod to establish an eﬀect over the employment level,
or to the fact that the variance of within-ﬁrm tenure structures had already
fallen, reducing diﬀerences in expected severance payments across ﬁrms.
Third, the output elasticity increases in the last subperiod. This may be
related to the fact that labor legislation reforms made it easier for ﬁrms to
adjust to the desired employment levels given changes in output. The re-
duction in severance payments and the abolition of job stability rights may
be interpreted as a lower level of the tax on dismissals. In addition, the
lower administrative costs of using temporary contracts made it easier for
formal ﬁrms to adapt to output changes. Finally, and in line with the pre-
vious result, we also ﬁnd a speedier employment adjustment during the
postreform period.
As discussed previously, labor market reforms facilitated formal ﬁrms’
adjustment to desired employment levels, through temporary contracts
and by reducing severance payments and eliminating job stability. This re-
duction in ﬁring costs may have the eﬀect of increasing turnover, as ﬁrms
174 Jaime Saavedra and Máximo Torerowill tend to increase hirings during expansions and ﬁrings during contrac-
tions. Using censored employment spells from diﬀerent data sets that span
the period 1985–1997, we ﬁnd evidence that mean tenure fell since 1992,
roughly coinciding with the beginning of labor market legislation changes,
suggesting an increase in turnover in the Peruvian labor market. The re-
duction in mean tenure may also be related to the recovery initiated in
1993, when salaried employment was created, both in the formal and in-
formal sector. However, even if mean tenure among informal workers fell,
among formal workers the fall is much larger and statistically signiﬁcant in
the post–labor reform period. This is showing, therefore, as mentioned by
Lindbeck and Snower (2002), that the smaller a ﬁrm’s labor turnover costs,
the more proﬁtable it is for the ﬁrm to stop bargaining with its current em-
ployees (insiders) and start bargaining with the new potential hires (out-
siders) instead. The diﬀerences in mean tenures between the formal and in-
formal sectors also fell signiﬁcantly during the 1990s.
The LSMSs for 1985 and 1994 allowed us to construct censored em-
ployment spells for currently employed workers and complete employment
spells for the unemployed and for workers that changed a job during the
twelve-month period before each survey. With this data we calculated em-
pirical hazards for several groups of workers. We found spikes at three
months of tenure, corresponding to the time at which the probationary pe-
riod ended among formal workers. However, these spikes are also found in
the informal sector. Also, spikes were found at the sixth and twelfth months,
probably related to renewal of short-term contracts—as a way to avoid job
stability measures—and to avoid discrete jumps in the severance payment.
After the reforms, there is an increase in the hazard function for formal
wage earners and an increase with respect to the hazard function of infor-
mal-sector wage earners. Large hazards in the third and sixth months are
observed among private formal workers, and not among public ones, con-
sistent with private ﬁrms’ using short-term contracts in order to avoid job
stability. Hazards are always higher for blue-collar workers, but the diﬀer-
ence between blue- and white-collar workers diminishes after the reforms.
Finally, we performed parametric estimations of hazard estimations in or-
der to control for demographic characteristics of workers. These conﬁrmed
the results of higher hazards for informal, younger, private, and blue-collar
workers. Education has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient, suggesting lower
hazards for the more educated, particularly after the reforms launched in
1991. There is evidence of a small relative increase in turnover for formal
wage earners after the reforms. Having a temporary contract increases the
hazard, suggesting higher turnover among these workers. This eﬀect dis-
appears by 1994, although temporary contracts were intensively used,
which may be related to a smaller diﬀerence in status between temporary
and permanent positions within a ﬁrm. Further work is needed, as 1994 is
close to the beginning of the labor market reforms.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To test for cyclical variations of total labor demand due to employment
composition changes (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992) we estimate the equa-
tion
ln Li,t   Xi,t     d ln L ˆ
i,t L   e ln L ˆ
i,t L   ln E(sp)i,t    t    Zi,t
  cyclet(Xi,t  )   εi,t,
where
  (b1, b2, c,  )
Xi,t   [w   p, Y, E(sp)],
where “cycle” is a dummy equal to zero in recessions and equal to 1 in ex-
pansions, and is interacted with all the regressors in the equation (Xi,t).
This variable has a value of 1 when sectoral growth is 4 percent or more and
zero otherwise. We used generalized least squares and correct for serial cor-
relation with a correlation coeﬃcient speciﬁc for each of the panels. The re-
sults of the estimations are shown in table 2B.1.
Appendix C
Equality of Empirical Hazard Functions
Graphical Analysis
In order to verify the equality of the hazard functions for complete and
incomplete spells we assume that incomplete spells are completed ones and
then compute the empirical hazard rates (Kaplan and Meier 1958) for both
types of spells. These estimates are shown in the graph; note that the em-
pirical hazard for incomplete spells has the same shape and spikes as the
complete ones. Hazard functions for complete spells are above those using
incomplete data, a fact that is consistent with lower mean tenures calcu-
lated using the former data set. Still, the pattern followed by the hazard
function looks similar.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
We  use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistic to formally test the
equality of the empirical hazards functions between complete and incom-
plete spells (deﬁned as uncensored spells). The test evaluates the closeness
of the distributions  is and  cs (for incomplete and complete spells hazards)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)by computing the least upper bound of all pointwise diﬀerences   ˆis(x) –
  ˆcs(x). We can write the K-S statistic D as
D   supx[  ˆis(x)    ˆcs(x)].
The null hypothesis (H0 :  is    cs) is accepted if  is is suﬃciently close to
 cs, in other words if the value of D is suﬃciently small or smaller than the
critical value at a certain signiﬁcance level. The results are shown in table
2C.1. At the 95 percent signiﬁcance level we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that the two empirical hazard functions are equally distributed.
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